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FINANCIAL REPORTING -- FACT OR FICTION?

THE EVOLUTION OF FINANCIAL REPORTING
Financial reporting has emerged today as a major

battleground which evokes the emotions of a wide spectrum of
conflicting interests in both the private and public sector.
Much of the controversy revolves around the question

of what is fact and what is fiction in financial reporting

as we know it today.

The high profile of financial reporting has come

about principally as a result of events in the 10-15 years.
However interest in financial reporting had its

first great impetus in the 1930s when the securities acts
established the SEC in an attempt to deal with fraud and abuses

in the securities markets.
It was at that critical point that the delicate
arrangement was worked out between the SEC and the public

accounting profession for the establishment of accounting
principles.

The rate of change in financial reporting from that

point until the mid 1960s was not spectacular.

However during

the 1960s a series of developments set in motion the problems

which we face today.
The first of these developments was a period of wide

spread speculation, corporate acquisitions and profit creation
through accounting gimmicks accompanied by the business failures
of the 1960s.
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The series of spectacular business failures epitomized
by Penn Central and Equity Funding took their toll in public
confidence in the reliability of financial reports.

This erosion in credibility was greatly aggravated by
the aura of distrust of the oil and gas companies that grew out
of the energy crisis.

People in government were convinced that these companies
and their independent auditors were conspiring to misrepresent the

true facts about their operations.
The final blow to credibility grew out of the Watergate

scandals which revealed illegal corporate political contributions

as well as bribes, slush funds and similar improprieties on the
part of many of the country's blue chip corporations.

Even were it not for these eroding factors, financial
reporting would probably have reached its present prominence
as a result of the impact of computer data processing and the
explosion of information and communication techniques.

No doubt these technological developments have generated

a heightened awareness of the importance of financial reporting
as the underpinning of all forms of economic statistics.

It is little wonder then, that financial reporting
has bec
ome the object of great interest not only in the business
world but in the Federal government as well.
Until recently, the battle over accounting principles

and disclosures in financial reporting was being fought principally
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between the SEC, industry and the public accounting profession

with some kibitzing from the academics.
But late in 1975 the U. S. Congress began to participate
in the fray and in less then a year and half it is threatening

to over-run both the SEC and the private sector.
The first event was the insertion of an amendment

in the 1975 energy legislation by Congressman Moss requiring the
SEC to see that uniform accounting for oil and gas companies

is established by December 1977.

For this purpose the SEC may

look to the FASB for development of the principles.

The next development was the issuance of a report
by a subcommittee chaired by Moss covering its oversight of the

SEC.

In that report the SEC and the public accounting profession

were soundly chastised for the perceived failures in financial
reporting and development of accounting principles.
The report was based upon the testimony of a single

witness, Profession Abe Briloff.
The report made the following recommendations:

MOSS RECOMMENDATIONS
SEC should:
1.

Prescribe by rule a framework of uniform accounting
principles

2.

Require auditors to attest that accounting

principles selected by management present fairly
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3.

Promulgate a rule to suspend from SEC practice
a CPA who falsifies or contributes to false

accounting records
4.

Require auditors to attest to the quality of
internal controls and the quality of enforcement

of those controls in the annual report
5.

Board of directors (majority independent of
management) have ability to hire and fire auditors

6.

Prescribe by rule -- auditing standards

7.

Prescribe by rule -- standards of conduct for
independent auditors -- individuals and firms --

practicing before SEC

8.

Legislation to repeal Hochfelder decision

9.

Refer willful cases to Justice Department rather
than injunctive action

While this was going on a subcommittee of the Senate
Government Operations Committee chaired by Senator Metcalf was
conducting a full scale study of the public accounting profession.
This study gathered information from the Big 8 firms,
the AICPA, the FASB, the SEC, NASBA and a host of other organizations.

The result was the issuance of a 190 page report by the
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subcommittee staff on January 17, 1977.
The report, accompanied by nearly 1500 pages of exhibits,

alleges that the Big 8 controls the AICPA and the FASB and conspires
with its clients to set accounting standards to suit private

rather than public interests.
The SEC is charged with being derelict by permitting this

conspiracy to occur.
The report recommends among other things the following,

which if adopted, would have a drastic effect on the practice of

public accounting and on financial reporting:
METCALF REPORT -- SUMMARY OF SUMMARY
1.

Accounting and auditing standards set by government

2.

Periodic quality reviews by government

3.

Standards of conduct set by government which prohibit:

4.

5.

a.

Direct or indirect representation of clients'
interest

b.

Performance of MAS services for public or
private clients

Consider requiring:
a.

Rotation of auditors

b.

More than one firm on ballot for election of
auditors

Fifteen largest firms be required to file annual

financial statements with the SEC
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6.

Auditors should be required to provide assurance
on fairness of financial statements and complete

ness and accuracy of corporate records
7.

The SEC should impose more stringent sanctions

on large firms and conduct their own compliance
reviews

8.

Congress, the FTC and Justice Department should
consider ways of deducing concentration of audit
and accounting services

9.

Repeal Hochfelder by legislation

SUMMARY OF METCALF RECOMMENDATIONS
1.

Congress should exercise its authority to achieve

proper accounting practices
2.

Congress should establish comprehensive accounting

objectives and abolish creative accounting,
percentage of completion, inflation accounting,

"normalized" accounting
3.

Congress should repeal Hochfelder

4.

Congress should consider ways to increase competition

between CPA firms:
a.

Rotation of auditors

b.

More than one firm on ballot for election by
shareholders
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5.

The federal government should establish financial

accounting standards for publicl
y owned companies:
a.

SEC may not be right body

b.

Maybe a separate federal board like CASB

c.

Maybe the GAO

with strong oversight by Congress
6.

Auditing standards should be set by the GAO, the

SEC or by federal statute
7.

Periodic quality reviews of CPA firms should be
made by the GAO, the SEC or a special audit
inspection agency

8.

The SEC should promulgate and enforce standards of
conduct for auditors and specifically prohibit

direct or indirect representation of client’s
interests and performance of MAS service for public

or private clients
9.

Fifteen largest firms should be required to file

annual financial statements with the SEC
10.

The federal government should define the responsi

bilities of independent auditors to require assurance

on fairness, and on completeness and accuracy of
corporate records
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11.

All standards (accounting, cost accounting and
auditing) should be set in open meetings

12.

Congress should consider methods for reducing
concentration of supply of auditing and accounting
services to major corporations.

FTC and Justice

Department should investigate whether there are
any anti-trust violations in supply of services
among industries

13.

Federal government should employ audit firms
only for audits and not for MAS

14.

The

SEC should impose equal sanctions on large

and small firms and should conduct their own

compliance reviews
15.

The membership of the CASB should be altered to
eliminate conflicts

16.

Federal employees should not serve on AICPA
committees

Another development which threatens to effect financial
reporting is the proposed legislation to curb illegal corporate

payments -- bribes, etc.
Senator Proxmire and the Senate Banking Committee
has introduced a bill which makes it a crime to:
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a.

fial to maintain accurate books and records

b.

fail to maintain an adequate system of internal
control

c.

lie to auditors in connection with an audit

We have opposed this legislation on several grounds.
The SEC has issued a release for comment which proposes

to accomplish administratively what the legislation would do -with modifications which meet some of our objections.

In summary, it is clear that Congress has joined the
list of participants in the struggle over financial reporting.

In the meantime other parties have been active.
Let me cite some of the more important events that are

taking place:
•

Arthur Andersen & Co. has sued the SEC over

the issue of preferability accompanied by a
challenge of ASR 150 which is gen
erally viewed

as the principal support for the FASB
•

Mr. Kapnick has attacked the FASB and called
for a full-scale reappraisal

•

The FAF has undertaken a full review of the

structure and operations of the FASB

•

The entire banking world rose up in massive

opposition to anticipated standards on restructured
debt
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•

The SEC has imposed the disclosure of replacement

cost data under ASR 190
•

The SEC has an advisory committee hard at work
on the entire subject of disclosure

•

The FASB is faced with a do or die effort on oil

and gas accounting
•

The FASB has issued a massive discussion memorandum

on a conceptual framework for accounting that among
other things addresses alternative methods of
valuation

•

The SEC is moving toward requiring reporting on
internal controls both by the registrant and its
independent auditor

In the light of this bewildering array of initiatives

directed at financial reporting we might be excused for wondering

if we know what we are doing and why.
It raises the question of what can reasonably be
expected o
f financial reporting?

Are we trying to achieve far more than is reasonable?

It is my purpose this evening to address these questions.

PARTICIPANTS AND EXPECTATIONS
It might be useful to first examine the various groups
who have a stake in financial reporting and what expectations they

have.
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This is important because it may be that their

expectations are so diverse or of such a nature that financial
reporting should not attempt to satisfy all of them.
For convenience I have identified some six categories

of participants.

They are:

1.

Financial analysts, investors and credit grantors

2.

The SEC

3.

Congress

4.

Independent auditors

5.

Academics

6.

Issuers of financial reports

What are the principal motiviations, expectations or

desires of each of these groups?
The financial analysts, investors and creditor grantors
are interested principally in determining whether an investment is,

or will be, both safe and profitable.

It should be noted that the

financial statements are but one of many kinds of information
that are needed or desired to meet this objective.
The SEC is motivated principally by a desire to assure

through regulation that the securities markets function both

fairly and free of fraud.

Their first objective is to make

sure that investors are not cheated through fraud or manipulation.

Over the years, however, the Commission has tended to take on
the responsibility of seeing that investors make sound investments.
I submit that there is a real difference in emphasis

-12-

between protecting from fraud and helping investors to make

wise decisions.

This extension of the Commission’s role is

at the root of the ever-expanding volume of disclosure require

ments we are experiencing today.

I will discuss this in more

detail in a few minutes.

The Congress has a number of objectives that depend
upon or utilize financial reporting to a significant degree:

a.

Especially important today is their desire to

regulate business.

Financial statements are an

important factor in any regulatory process.

b.

Congress also is increasingly involved in estab
lishing economic and social policies in our nation.

We are rapidly becoming a planned society and
financial reports are essential to the planning

process.

c.

Government raises revenues principally through

income taxes based on financial reports.

Thus

any changes in financial reporting can have a

serious effect on revenues.

Congressman Vanik’s

concerns about Lifo and current value methods is

an example of this type of pressure arising from
expectations.

Independent auditors are mainly concerned about being

able to satisfy themselves as to the reliability of financial
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reporting.

Their concern centers on auditability.

Hence they

tend to resist any movement toward soft-data reporting -- data
that does not lend itself to objective verification.

Academics are generally more interested in a search
for "truth" in financial reporting.

This search for truth takes

the form of a yearning for a set of basic principles -- a con
ceptual framework -- from which answers to all accounting
measurement and disclosure questions shall flow.

Generally

academics seem to have as an objective the bringing together of
economic concepts and financial reporting.

Finally there are the issuers of financial reports.

They normally prefer to keep the costs of external reporting to
a minimum by keeping the volume of information as low as possible.
Admittedly enlightened issuers are interested in

giving a fair picture of their companies but this is motivated
principally by a desire to present their companies in a favor
able light to maintain a good market for their stock.

Issuers are torn by conflicting desires however
because they prefer not to disclose information that might do

harm to their competitive position.

On balance, issuers can

be counted on to resist extensions or additions to the financial
reporting process.

Given the diversity of objectives and expectations of the
six groups that I have just described, is it any wonder that
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the setting of standards for financial reporting has become

frighted with intense pressures and emotions.
Clearly each group answers the question of ’’financial
reporting -- fact or fiction?” from the perspective of their

What may be fact for one group is

own needs and expectations.
prue fiction for another.

there is no commonality.

This is not to assert, however that
I am merely making the point that

financial reporting is faced with the almost impossible task

of trying to satisfy needs that are to a considerable degree
diametrically opposed.
Traditionally we have tried to meet these needs with
a single set of general purpose financial reports.

the only practical approach.

This has been

But because we have been trying

more and more to meet the needs of all comers we are reaching
the point where the message is getting lost in the sheer volume

and complexity of information being communicated.

This is the

overload problem which most people recognize but don’t know how
to cure.

Are we doomed to gon on -- forever expanding the quantity
of information in financial reporting?

Or is there a solution?

This brings me back to my main question -- Are we
trying to achieve more than can be reasonably expected of

financial reporting?
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MYTHS ABOUT FINANCIAL REPORTING

In attempting to answer this question I have identified
what I consider to be three myths about financial reporting which

persist among us and which contribute greatly to our confusion.
The first of these myths is that financial reports

play a major role in the making of decisions about investments.
It is true that financial data is a factor but the importance

of its role in making investment decisions is, I submit, greatly
oversold.

We are all aware of the efficient market theory which

no doubt is at least partially valid.

If this is so then financial

reports serve to confirm that investment decisions have been
good or bad rather than as a principal basis for making the

investment decision in the first place.

Those who would attempt

to determine how investment decisions are made may well end up

concluding that the answer is as diverse as the number of
decision makers.

If you would argue with what I am saying I

would ask you these questions?
1.

Is market behavior a logical process or an

emotional-psychological process -- or a
combination?

2.

How much information is enough to make an
prudent decision?

3.

Is there any practical way to deal with the

differences in the importance of one piece

of information vs. another or one combination
vs. another?
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The point is we simply can not reduce the making of

sound investment decisions to a neat formula.

Because this is

not possible we should recognize and admit that financial
reports have limited utility in making investment decisions.

They serve to confirm or refute our prior predictions of future
events.

In this sense they become one factor among many other

types of information which we take into account in our current

forecasts of the future.
This limitation of role has great significance with

respect to our aspirations for financial statements.

We are

no longer obliged to strive toward reflecting economic "truth”.
Rather consistency of measurement, comparability and disclosure

of information about potential changes in circumstances becomes
of primary importance.

Put more simply, the method of measurement

becomes less important than the need to be consistent and to
disclose facts relevant to potential changes in circumstances.
The second myth is the belief that most of the

difficulties with financial reporting stem from our failure to

establish a basic set of principles or a conceptual framework
of accounting.
The notion that there are some basic truths that only

await discovery ignores the fact that financial accounting

standards are simply conventions that are arbitrarily derived
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out of experience and general acceptance.

The yearning for a conceptual framework that would

yield a set of accounting principles that are completely con
sistent internally is understandable.

It would give us the

comfort of feeling we had discovered "truth" and provide a sure
fire defense against challenges to the validity of particular
accounting principles.

It would provide ready answers to all

of our future accounting problems.

To believe that such a goal can be achieved is to

ignore the fact that there are multiple groups with a conflicting
objectives and expectations in their uses of accounting data,
as I have previously described.

It is the tension between

the motivations of these groups that makes the establishment

of accounting standards essentially a political process.

Success

in setting standards depends not on discovery of an internally
consistent framework but rather on the art of finding a balance
point between the conflicting interests.

The phrase "generally

accepted" rightly recognizes that the validity of accounting

standards is dependent upon a broad base of acceptance rather
than upon objective proof.

Stated another way, accounting standards are established

by legislative fiat in a highly charged political environment.

The FASB, the SEC and Congress have all participated in that
process and in all probability will continue to do so.

Under these
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circumstances it is sheer folly to assume that some scheme of

basic principles or definitions of terms or priority of emphasis
between balance sheet or statement of earnings will lead to

a truce in the war over accounting standards or widespread agree
ment that financial reporting is all fact and no fiction.
It may well be that some benefit can be derived from
defining more precisely our terms or our objectives.

But we

ought not waste our energies searching for a "holy grail" which

will only be trampled underfoot on the legislative battleground.
The third myth, which is almost the same as the second,
is the belief that we can develop a scheme of financial reporting

that will meet, at least to a reasonable degree, the objectives and

expectations of all six groups that I described in my earlier
remarks.

We ought to recognize that the many conflicts in interests

makes a high degree of success toward this goal highly unlikely.

We shall always be plagued by the by the trade-offs
between the costs and benefits.

Thus adoption of multiple

rather than general purpose financial reports is unlikely to be

an acceptable solution.

We shall always be torn between the need for objective

auditability and a desire to move closer to economic reality
through the use of soft data.
There will always be differences in the types of data

that are best suited for regulatory purposes as contrasted with
economic planning or making investment decisions.
We cannot escape the fact that the need for comparable
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data is not compatible with the need for data that is more
precisely tailored to a particular set of circumstances.

Given these many conflicting objectives the most
we can hope to achieve is a basic package of financial inform

ation which will have general utility for all groups but will

probably not fully meet the eneds of any.

If we face up to

and accept this fact it can have a significant bearing on

our approach to financial reporting.

We can abandon what seems

to be our current goal of trying to fully satisfy everyone’s
needs.

We can concentrate on developing a sound basic package

which will yield a high degree of comparability.

We can accept

the fact that financial reports do not necessarily reflect economic

reality.

We can adopt an approach to disclosure on an exception

basis rather than the current all-inclusive basis.

My point is simply this.

We are trying to achieve

more than can reasonably be accomplished with financial reporting.

We need to stope clinging to the myths I have been describing
and adopt more modest goals for financial reporting.

If we do

this in a realistic fashion we will greatly reduce the level
of our frustration and stope the erosion of credibility which
is certain to continue if we go on striving to achieve unrealistic

goals and objectives for financial reporting.
A SUGGESTED APPROACH

If we adopt more modest goals what approach should we

pursue?
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Our principal objective should be to report important

factual information on a uniform basis to permit a maximum

degree of comparability.

Our main concern should be to thwart

manipulation within financial reports.

Thus prevention of

fraud and the needs of regulation should serve as our guide in
designing the form and content of financial reports and in

establishing accounting standards.
We should abandon the notion of trying to help investors

and credit grantors to make good decisions except to the extent
that prevention of fraud helps them to avoid being mislead.

It is impossible to design a reporting and disclosure system
that can anticipate all the vagaries of the decision-making

process and we should not try.
We should design a basic package of information which

includes data about generally recognized indicators of operating

success or failure.

This basic package should be carefully

defined so as to set practical limits on the amount of disclosures.

Issuers of financial reports based upon such a basic
package of information should be charged with disclosing any

additional material facts on an exception basis.

What would

constitute a material fact would depend upon the individual cir

cumstances but would usually be any information that would have
a substantial abnormal effect or influence on earnings.
We should also change the format of financial reports
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to group all information by the functional areas of a business

to make it more understandable.

At the present time, information

about similar subject matter is scattered throughout annual
reports in the president’s letter, management’s analysis of

operations, in the financial statements and in footnotes.

We

should consider grouping all information in sections by subject
matter which might be classified by functions within a business

such as sales and marketing, manufacturing, labor relations
and personnel, etc.

If this were done the present financial

statement format might be retained but in greatly condensed
form as a link to past practices.

If the foregoing approach were adopted several changes
in emphasis would occur.

1.

The burden of disclosing material facts on an

exception basis would be placed on issuers and

would no longer be a mechanistic responsibility

of complying with detailed rules.

Thus an

ever-increasing volume of all-inclusive disclosure

requirements could be brough to a halt.

2.

Users would be charged with the burden of utilizing

the information in whatever way that satisfied them
for making their decisions.

3.

Auditors would be required to verify on a test
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basis the reliability of the basic information

and to search for additional material facts
that should be disclosed to prevent investors

from being mislead.

4.

By not trying to help investors and credit grantors

to make "good" decisions we need have less concern
about reflecting economic values.

Rather our

emphasis could be placed on a uniform system of

measurement to gain a maximum degree of comparability.
As a result we could be less concerned about searching
for "truth" in accounting standards and be more com

fortable with eliminating alternative accounting

methods on a more or less arbitrary basis.
SUMMARY
To summarize, I believe that over the years the SEC,
the academics, the issuers and the auditors have succumbed to the

siren song of the users.

That song has been that the main

objective of financial statements is the help users make "good"

decisions -- to reduce the risks in investment decisions.

I submit that financial statements cannot meet such
an ambitious objective.

They can help reduce the risk of being

mislead by fraud or manipulation and they can confirm whether
prior investment decisions were good or bad.

But designing a

financial report that would substantially reduce the incidence
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of "bad” decisions is an impossible task and ignores the
tremendous complexity of the decision-making process.

If we adopt more modest objectives for financial
reporting our focus can be sharper and we can be more effective.

We can adopt uniform measurement as our guide in setting
accounting standards and gain greater comparability which is

a strong antidote to manipulation.

Realiability can be placed

ahead of economic reality as a goal.
The question would become not "financial reporting -fact or fiction?" but "financial reporting -- reliable or
unreliable?".

#

#

#

#

